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1. Introduction
Two seemingly unconnected empirical results suggest an intriguing mechanism. First, economic
integration helps harmonize prices internationally, with trade being the primary channel (Rogoff 1996,
Goldberg and Knetter 1997). Second, monetary union may greatly increase the amount of trade among
members (Rose 2001). Putting these together, we see that formation of a monetary union may induce
changes that help harmonise inflation rates. The effect might be large if the elimination of exchange rate
volatility simultaneously leads to a large increase in intra-union trade and a big increase in the speed at
which price shocks are transmitted across members’ goods markets.
The problem is that standard estimates of price transmission speed (Rogoff 1996, Goldberg and
Knetter 1997) suggest that trade’s price-homogenising effect operates too slowly to matter much – so
slowly that many find the domestic-foreign price gap to be a random walk. Some new empirical evidence
(Parsley and Wei 2001, and Asplund and Friberg 2001) suggests that a reduction in exchange rate
variability reduces the variability of international price differences. Moreover, the effect seems to be
highly nonlinear, and monetary union seems to have an effect even controlling for exchange rate
volatility.
This paper is a first attempt to piece together part of this mechanism, namely the impact of
monetary union (and exchange rate volatility more generally) on the international transmission of price
shocks via the imported/exported inflation channel. In doing this we generate specific testable hypotheses
and confront these with a number of data sets on European trade prices.
In our simple model, a change in exchange rate volatility – formation of a monetary union, for
example – induces trading firms to change their behaviour in a way that tends to harmonize aggregate
price movements between nations. Our model combines elements from new work by Friberg (2001) with
elements drawn from the old sunk-cost hysteresis literature (Baldwin 1988, Baldwin and Krugman 1989,
Dixit 1990), and especially its application to European monetary union (Baldwin 1991).
The paper begins by presenting the mechanism linking exchange rate volatility and trade price
pass-through (Section 2). As part of this, Section 2 studies pricing behaviour under the two usual extreme
assumptions of perfectly segmented markets and perfectly integrated markets. It then proceeds to
endogenise the degree of segmentation and to study the implications of this for pass-through. Section 3
takes the model’s main predictions to the data and empirically tests the hypotheses. The final section
presents our concluding remarks.
2. Theoretical underpinnings
Firms engaged in international trade frequently set different prices for their goods in different
markets. Actual and potential arbitrage, however, tends to limit the extent of such price gaps. If prices
diverge sufficiently – and the goods sold in the different markets are sufficiently good substitutes – third
parties will be tempted to arbitrage price gaps by re-exporting, re-importing goods, or by simply re-
directing exports before they reach their intended destination. What all this goes to say is that unless firms
explicitly engage in strategies to make price arbitrage expensive or illegal, their ability to price
discrimination will naturally be limited.
The theoretical framework in this paper studies the optimal degree of market segmentation from
the perspective of trading firms, by looking at the cost and benefits of ‘buying’ a given degree of market
segmentation (defined as the maximum price gap that cannot be arbitraged). As it turns out, exchange rate
volatility has an important impact on the degree of optimal market segmentation (Friberg 2001). The logic
involves three steps.3
First, discriminatory pricing is always profitable when demand elasticities vary across markets, but
exchange rate variation is surely a far more important real-world motive for wanting to price discriminate.
When the exchange rate gets a long way from its steady state value, firms will have a very large profit-
incentive to ‘price to market’, i.e. to charge very different prices in different markets. Since this is true for
both appreciations and depreciations, the value of being able to price discriminate is a U-shaped function
of the level of the exchange rate, with the nadir of the U at the long-run exchange rate. The second step is
to note that the expected value of this U-shaped function changes with the volatility of the exchange rate.
In essence, a more volatile exchange rate means that one more frequently observes exchange rates where
it would be very profitable to price discriminate. The final step is to consider the cost of market
segmentation. Assuming that a higher degree of market segmentation involves corporate strategies that
are progressively more expensive, profit maximising firms will choose a degree of segmentation (i.e. a
maximum price gap) where the marginal benefit of further segmentation just equals its marginal cost.
Because reduced exchange rate volatility lowers the marginal benefit of segmentation, firms will find it
optimal to lower the degree of market segmentation in response to dampened exchange rate variability.
2.1.  Basic Model
To illustrate the main economic logic of our analytic framework, we start with the simplest
possible partial equilibrium model. We suppose there are only two nations and we consider a market
where a monopolist (located in the ‘home’ country) sells in both markets. The market in each nation is a
priori identical with demand in the two markets given by:
(1)
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where p and q represent the price and quantity sold respectively; variables without an”*” are home-nation
variables, while those with an ”*” are foreign nation variables. Without loss of generality, units are
chosen so that the slopes of the identical demand curves are unity.
The firm’s production technology involves constant marginal costs such that:
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where c is the constant marginal cost, which depends on w, the home nation wage, and aq, the unit input
labour requirement, both of which are taken as constant.
For simplicity’s sake, we ignore all forms of trade costs (natural and manmade), so the firm’s two-
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where ’s’ is the exchange rate (s is a mnemonic for spot rate) defined as foreign currency units per unit of
home currency. Note that a fall in ’s’ raises the competitiveness of home-nation goods in the foreign
market, i.e. is a depreciation of the home currency.
2.2.  Polar segmentation assumptions
Trade theory typically views international markets as integrated – prices must be identical in all
markets, i.e. third-degree price discrimination is not possible – or segmented, i.e. firms can set prices
independently. To fix ideas, we first work out the firm’s problem assuming perfectly segmented markets,
i.e. assuming no constraint on the choice of p and p*.
2.2.1  Perfectly segmented markets
When markets are perfectly segmented, the firm is free to choose a price in each market. The












Since (3) is strictly concave in p and p*, the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient, so (4)
gives the profit maximisation prices with perfectly segmented markets. Notice that a sufficiently high ’s’
will yield a p* that involves zero foreign sales. Specifically, the choke-off ’s’ equals a/c; for spot rates
higher than this, optimal foreign sales are zero. Using these optimal prices in the objective function, the



















for s>a/c, the profit function consists only of the first term in the expression since no foreign sales are
made; ’PSM’ is a mnemonic for perfectly segmented markets.
Expression (5) shows that the profit function is inherently asymmetric with respect to the
exchange rate, s. As the spot rate rises, the home-based firm loses competitiveness in the foreign market
and eventually stops exporting. (With linear demand this happens at a finite s, but with general demand,
exports limit to zero as sﬁ¥.) But as the spot rate declines, the profitability of exports sales increases
without bound in terms of home country currency. This has nothing to do with functional forms because it
is driven by the translation of foreign currency earnings into local currency units.
2.2.2  Perfectly integrated markets
The other extreme assumption is perfectly integrated markets, i.e. where firms are constrained to
choose a single price for sales to the two markets – presumably for reasons having to do with potential
resale among consumers. The firm’s problem in this case is identical to that of the previous sections with
the sole addition of the integrated market constraint, namely p=p*. Solving (3) subject to p=p* yields
optimal home and foreign prices (which differ only by s). Note that as ‘s’ falls, the foreign market
becomes increasingly attractive, so eventually the firm sets a price that implies zero home sales. The value
of this choke-off s is c/(2a-c). Plugging the optimal prices back into (3), the profit function under the













) 1 ( 4
)) 1 ( 2 (
2
for s below the choke-off level, the firm sells only to foreigners and chooses the optimal price for foreign
sales as given in (4), with PIM the mnemonic for perfectly integrated markets.5
Figure 1: Difference between profits under PSM and PIM assumptions
2.2.3  Friberg’s insight
We turn now to showing the insight, due to Friberg (2001), that the reward to being able to engage
in segmented-market pricing versus integrated-market pricing depends in a large part on the exchange
rate’s probability distribution. This general result can be directly illustrated with our simple model.
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While this is not everywhere convex – because of the asymmetric effects of appreciation and
depreciation – it is convex in the neighbourhood of the long-run exchange rate s=1. The left panel of
Figure 1 plots the two profit functions against s; the higher curve is P
PSM and the lower curve is P
PIM.
Clearly the wedge between the two, and thus the value of being able to price discriminate, increases as ‘s’
deviates from its long-run value (which is here normalised to unity). The right panel plots the P
PSM-P
PIM
directly against s; this clearly shows the intrinsic asymmetry involved in the PSM-vs-PIM wedge.
Figure 2: Volatility and the expected value of the PSM-vs-PIM wedge
The next step is to show that the expected value of the PSM-vs-PIM wedge is increasing in the
volatility of the exchange rate. If the wedge were a strictly convex function, this result would be a
straightforward application of Jensen’s inequality. Given the asymmetry, however, the wedge will not in
general be strictly convex; it is probably for this reason that Friberg (2001) is unable to prove a general
r F
r F’
For the parameter values use to draw the figure (a=10, c=1), the choke off points are 1/19 and 10.6
relationship between exchange rate volatility and the value of market segmentation. Nevertheless, he
conjectures that such a relationship exists (see his Corollary 2 and discussion).
Using our simple functional forms and an additional simple assumption on the stochastic process
driving the exchange rate, we can establish a link between volatility and the reward to segmentation by
direct calculation. Assuming that the exchange is uniformly distributed on a support [1-s/2,1+s/2], the
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where s measures exchange rate volatility. Note that s£2, since s‡0. Inspection of (8) shows:
Result 1: The expected value of having perfectly segmented markets, as opposed to perfectly
integrated markets, increases as exchange rate volatility increases.
A more complete characterisation of the link between volatility and expected value of the PSM-vs-
PIM wedge is shown in Figure 2 (here a=10 and c=1). Notice that the relationship is highly nonlinear; the
impact of volatility reduction on the value of having perfect segmentation gets weaker as the level of
volatility falls. Next, consider an extension that allows us to endogenise market segmentation.
2.3.  Variably segmented markets
The classification of markets into perfectly segmented or perfectly integrated is theoretically
convenient, but not terribly realistic. More generally, one expects that firms can engage in a whole array
of strategies that make cross-market re-sale increasingly difficult.
Market Segmentation Technology
The key aspect of segmentation is the inability of consumers to re-sell goods across markets since
this prevents arbitrageurs from exploiting and eroding price differences. The European Union (EU) does
not allowed firms to forbid re-sale within the EU, so segmentation requires some sort of product
differentiation, perhaps combined with government regulation. For example, a German food company that
wishes to price discriminate between the German and French markets, but not between the German and
Dutch markets, could produce one version of the good with a German-and-Dutch-language label and
another with a French-language-only label. This labelling would make it expensive to arbitrage price
differences, but not impossible unless this differentiation were combined with  government regulations on
the sale of food labelled in the ‘wrong’ language and a ban on third party re-labelling. Implementing this
strategy may involve a fixed cost in adjusting the production line; an investment that may be worthwhile,
the exchange rate is very volatile.
In particular, suppose the segmentation technology involves a one-time sunk cost – call it F – that
does not depreciate, so the firm will sink the cost if the expected value of doing so exceeds the sunk cost.
Analysis of this sort of investment decision under a variety of stochastic processes is well understood. To
illustrate our main points as simply as possible, assume the exchange-rate process over time is
independently and identically distributed (iid) over the support 1-s/2 to 1+s/2 (so s is a measure of
volatility). In this case, the firm undertakes the segmenting investment if and only if rF exceeds the one-
period expected value of the PSM-vs-PIM wedge.
With this simple market segmentation technology, Figure 2 shows that reducing exchange rate
volatility would make it less likely that firms find segmentation profitable. For example, if the sunk cost
facing a particular firm is F, then our measure of volatility would have to fall below 0.5 to make
segmentation unattractive to the firm. Volatility would have to fall below 0.25 to make it unprofitable
when the fixed cost was F’. Notice that the impact of reduced volatility on segmentation is nonlinear here,
but the form of the nonlinearity indicates that there would be little difference between very low volatility7
and a true monetary union. Since this seems to be counterfactual, given the empirical studies discussed
above, we must go beyond the Friberg framework that relies on sunk costs.
Variably Segmented Markets Assumptions
To model firms’ choice over variable segmentation, we suppose that firms can choose a strategy
that allows them to charge cross-market price gap of up to “G” without fear of re-sale; to be concrete, we
assume that G is fixed in foreign currency terms (G is a mnemonic for gap). More specifically, for a given
G, the firm acts as if markets are perfectly segmented when ‘s’ is such that they want to charge prices
within the following range:
(9) G sp p p G sp - £ £ + * *,
The left-hand inequality is relevant when s is low, so the home price looks very attractive to foreign
consumers when translated into foreign currency terms – attractive enough to make it worthwhile paying
the arbitrage cost of G per unit bought. The right-hand inequality is relevant when s is high enough to
make home residents consider re-importing the good from abroad despite the arbitrage cost.
We refer to this framework as “variably segmented markets” and note that it will allow us to
endogenously determine the extent of market segmentation. The segmentation technology is such that the
firm faces a rising cost of implementing strategies that raise G. To be concrete and to simplify
calculations, we assume the segmentation cost function is:
(10)
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This implies that the marginal cost of a higher G is positive and rising in G. The idea here is that it
becomes increasingly costly for a firm to institute strategies that permit it to charge progressively wider
gaps.
2.3.1  Modelling variable market segmentation
The assumption of variably segmented markets (VSM) yields a richer problem for the firm. To
explore this we consider the expected value of having a particular level of G. The firm will face three
types of exchange rates. If s is close enough to its long-run level (unity), then it can act as if the market
were perfectly segmented, since its profit-maximising prices imply a cross-market price gap that is too
small to arbitrage. In this case, its problem and solution is identical to the one in (5). If, however, s is
sufficiently high, the solution to its profit maximisation problem will involve the constraint that p*=sp-G,
and if s is sufficiently low, the constraint will be p*=sp+G. The critical values of s are easily determined,
since when the inequalities in (9) hold with equality, the firm will be pricing according to (4). Using this










This implies that the width of the hysteresis band, i.e. the band where arbitrage provides zero
pressure for price convergence, is:








notice that this hysteresis band widens with G at an increasing rate, i.e. the band is convex in G.
In the two regions of s where the arbitrage constraint binds, optimal prices are:8
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The optimal prices in the band are given by (4). Plugging these optimal prices into the definition
of profits yields three different profit functions that we do not report since they are not particularly
revealing.
Figure 3: VSM vs. PIM profit functions, and marginal benefit and cost of G
We can illustrate the impact of variably segmented markets (VSM) with the left panel of Figure 3.
For a given G, the high and low bounds on s will be fixed and for realisations of the exchange rate within
this range, the difference between VSM and PIM is identical to the difference between PSM and PIM as
in the right panel of Figure 1. When s is higher than shi, the firm is able to do somewhat better under VSM
than it would with perfectly integrated markets, but not as well as if it had perfectly segmented markets.
This is shown with the bottom dashed line on the right side of the diagram. Similarly, when s is below slo,
the firm does better than PIM but worse that PSM, as shown by the lower right-side dashed line.
If the firm ’buys’ a higher level of segmentation, as measured by G’, then its profits will
unambiguously be higher or equal to those with G. The diagram shows this with the upper dashed lines on
the right and left sides of the diagram. Notice that the benefit of higher G shows up only for exchange
rates that are sufficiently far from the long-run level.
2.4.  Endogenous, variable market segmentation
Since the exchange rate is a random variable, optimising firms will choose the optimal G by
considering the expected value of having a given level of market segmentation. The expected value is the
sum of three parts. For s between 1-s/2 (the minimum realisation of s) and slo, the relevant profit function
will be profits maximised subject to the left-hand price constraint in (9). For s between slo and shi, the
relevant profit function is (5), and for s between shi and 1+s/2 (maximum realisation of s) the profit
function is profits maximised subject to the right-hand price constraint in (9). Integrating over the three
ranges and subtracting the result from the expected value of perfectly integrated markets (which is
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where slo and shi are defined in (11).
It is important to note that this calculation assumes that G is such that the ordering of integration
limits is correct, namely that 1-s/2 ‡ slo and 1+s/2 ‡shi. Since slo and shi depend upon G, this puts
restrictions on the permissible G. Intuitively, the point is that no firm would ever find it profitable to buy a
G that was so high that no price constraint was ever strictly binding. The specific restriction is that
optimal G’s will be less than as/2(2+s).
Volatility and segmentation in the MB MC diagram
To illustrate the optimal choice of G, and thus the optimal hysteresis bandwidth, we plot the
marginal benefit of G – i.e. the partial of (14) with respect to G – and the marginal costs in the right panel
of Figure 3. As per (10), MC is rising. The MB curve is more involved. For a given level of exchange rate
volatility, an increase in G widens the hysteresis band. Figure 3 helps us to evaluate the impact of this on
EV. As the band widens, some realisations of s will correspond to a high profit level (the solid PSM vs
PIM line instead of the dashed line), so a higher G will clearly raise EV. However, each successive
increase in G affects a progressively narrower range of s. As a consequence, the marginal benefit of
raising G falls with the level of G, as shown in the right panel of Figure 3.
The optimal G corresponds to the intersection of the MC and MB curves. For sufficiently high
exchange rate volatility, for example s’, the firm will choose a positive G’. As the figure shows, lowering
s to, say s”,will result in a progressively lower optimal G, viz. G”. Importantly, this model predicts
segmentation only reaches zero when the level of is zero. The analysis can be summarised as follows:
Result 2: The degree of endogenous market segmentation – as measured by the width of the
hysteresis band – falls as the level of exchange rate volatility falls.
The testable implication of this result is clear. The estimated bandwidth should be narrower when
using data for nations that have experienced relatively little bilateral exchange rate variation.
3. A Natural Experiment: The DM Bloc
The theoretical model suggests that pass-through should be linked to bilateral exchange rate
volatility, but bringing this prediction to the data is problematic. The logic of our model suggests that
pass-through is the result of conscious investments by firms. Since some of these investments are
presumably long lasting – for example, the decision to produce differentiated products for export markets,
or lobbying for regulatory segmentation – it is somewhat difficult to know how to measure volatility.
Firms make the investment today in expectation of tomorrow’s volatility, so what we need is a measure of
how volatile firms expected the exchange rate to be in the next few years. While there are a variety of
ways of dealing with this econometrically, we choose instead to rely on a natural experiment.
With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in the 1970s, Europe adopted a
string of managed exchange rate systems. European bilateral exchange rates nevertheless fluctuated
widely with one important exception. Right from the beginning of post-Bretton Woods period, a group of
countries – the deutschemark (DM) bloc – maintained quite tight bilateral rates. For example, the DM-
guilder bilateral rate was not realigned between 1983 and the start of the monetary union and the bilateral
exchange rate fluctuated within a very narrow band during this period, even narrower than the maximum10
allowed under the European Monetary System’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Similarly, the Danish
crown, Belgium franc, and Austrian schilling have had very stable relationships with the DM since the
late 1980s.
Figure 4: Bilateral exchange rate volatility, DM bloc and others, 1960-1994
Importantly, this arrangement was stable and widely expected to continue. As Figure 4 shows, the
DM bloc exchange rates stayed close throughout the long sequence of exchange rate crises in the 1970s,
1980s and 1990s. Firms engaged in intra-DM bloc trading should, therefore, have had sufficient time and
incentives to adjust their segmenting strategies to the lower degree of exchange rate volatility. What this
means is that historical data should reveal  a difference in trade-pricing behaviour between Germany and
the DM bloc nations and between Germany and other nations.
3.1.   Null hypothesis: naïve linear model
Our theoretical model generates a number of testable predictions, but the most obvious are: (a)
pass-through behaviour should depend upon bilateral exchange rate volatility, and (b) there exists a band
or threshold which creates nonlinear adjustment to long-run equilibrium (resulting from a greater
tendency for arbitrage outside the band compared to inside the band). Thus as a first cut, we investigate
whether we can reject the null hypothesis that pass-through behaviour is unrelated to exchange rate
volatility.
3.1.1  The naïve empirical model
To test the null hypothesis we need an empirical model and here we adopt the “linear model” that
has been used countless times in the purchasing power parity (PPP) and law of one price (LOOP)
literature (see Rogoff 1996 for an overview). This model focuses on the gap between prices charged in
different locations measured in the same currency (i.e., in this case, the gap between a country’s export
price and its domestic price). Taking ‘z’ as the price gap, the model is usually written as:
(15)  t t t e z z + = D -1 l
where et is an iid error term is iid. Thus, we assume that zt follows an AR(1)process. For convenience, the
model is not specified in terms of the underlying AR(1) parameter r but rather the speed-of-convergence
parameter, l”r-1. That is, l obeys –1 £ l £ 0 and it is the convergence speed in the sense that price
differentials are reduced each period by a fraction l plus an error term. A l equal to zero implies perfect
persistence (random walk); a l equal to minus one indicates zero persistence (iid behaviour).
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We test this simple AR(1) specification using a panel of German import price data from 17
industrialised trade partners covering 10 manufacturing (2-digit) sectors in the period 1975-1995 (see data
appendix for details). Specifically, we denote pt
1 and pt
2  as the log price levels of a good in two locations
at time t. In our dataset, pt
1 is the German import price of goods imported from country 2, and pt
2 is the
producer price in country 2 (the exporting country) both measured in the exporter’s currency, and the
difference between these two prices is the price gap.
A non-parametric test based on Cuzick (1985) fully rejects the presence of a trend in the data.
Since the data are in index form, even in a world of perfect arbitrage, eventual mismatches could produce
a constant gap. In order to overcome this potential problem, we demean the data. Specifically, we
generate the price gap, zt, as the OLS residual from the regression of ln(pt
1-pt
2) on a constant  (however,
qualitatively identical results are obtained using non-demeaned data series
1).
Testing for unit roots
Equation (15) is roughly equivalent to the usual specifications used for testing for a unit root, and
standard unit root tests would be the best way of testing whether l is equivalent or different to zero.
Therefore, the obvious first step would be to also use equation (15) to establish whether the price gap data
are stationary. However, a problem arises because our main hypothesis is that the price gap moves in a
nonlinear fashion due to threshold effects. Several papers demonstrate that standard unit tests can give
misleading results in the presence of nonlinear or threshold effects, hence unit root tests based on equation
(15) would be unreliable given the threshold effects predicted by our theoretical model.
2 Although there
are several papers that show how to test for a unit root in the presence of nonlinearities or threshold
effects,
3  they are all derived for use in time series analysis and can not be easily translated for use in
panel estimation.
4 Accordingly, we do not test whether the price gap panel-data are stationary as the
results could be quite misleading.
Results
Following the logic of the DM bloc natural experiment, we distinguished between import suppliers
belonging to the so called DM-block and other EU countries traditionally displaying highly volatile
bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis Germany. We grouped data together for  imports from Austria, Belgium
(and Luxemburg), Denmark, and the Netherlands in one sub-sample (the DM bloc), and data on imports
from France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom in another.
As Table 1 shows, the difference in coefficients for the two groups using the naïve linear model
(equation 15) is clear.
5 The price gaps for intra-DM bloc trade are much less persistent (i.e.,  l nearer to
minus one) than the gaps for German imports from other EU nations. Specifically, it takes about a year
and a half for half of a price shock to be reabsorbed (half life of 1.52 periods) for intra-DM bloc trade,
while it takes more than 20 months for the ones coming from the rest of the EU. 
6
Of course the fact that the two different datasets produce different estimates does not allow us to
conclude that the difference is due to exchange rate volatility since, for example, the intra-DM bloc might
involve a substantially different set of traded goods. We can say, however, that the fact that adjustment is
                                               
1 See Table 3 in appendix 3.
2 For example, Peel and Sarno (2001) demonstrate the very low power of standard univariate unit-root tests to reject a false null
hypothesis of unit root behaviour when the true model is non-linearly mean reverting.
3 See, for example, Caner and Hansen (2001), Enders and Granger (1998), Shin and Lee (2001), etc.
4 For example, testing for unit roots with threshold effects in the time series literature requires the computation of new critical
values, etc, which is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
5 As mentioned earlier, we do not test the data for unit roots because we do not have the correct panel-data critical values.
Nevertheless, the large magnitude of the t-statistics for l shown in Table 1, suggest that the critical values would have to be
extremely high if we were to reject the hypothesis of stationarity.
6 More formally, a log likelihood ratio test shows that the difference between the parameters is statistically significant at the 5%
level of significance.12
quicker in the less volatile exchange rate  environment is certainly consistent with our basic notion that
firms choose to invest less in segmenting markets where the bilateral exchange rate is less volatile.
7
Table 1: Testing the naïve linear model
Linear AR1 specification
Lambda AR1  half-life
All -0.328 1.74
(0.006)***
DM Block -0.367 1.52
(0.007)***
Other EU -0.337 1.69
(0.017)***
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 1%
level. Panel estimates on annual data for period 1975-1995 for a total dataset covering
potentially 17 trade partners and 10 manufacturing sectors. However, in this case,
”All”  represents the DM bloc countries plus the other EU countries.
Additional supporting evidence can be found by splitting the whole sample of import data into two
sets of observations, one displaying low volatility and the second high volatility. In this exercise, we also
include data on imports from Canada, Finland, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and United States as well as
the DM bloc and other EU nations. The resulting split is not country-specific since some suppliers may be
classed as low-volatility in some years and high volatility in other years. Running the simple naïve linear
model on these two separate samples also produces significantly different coefficients, with price gaps in
the more volatile dataset displaying greater persistence (see results on right hand side of Table 3 in
appendix 3). Again, this is in line with our theoretical priors.
3.2.  Testing for pass-through hysteresis bands
Confirmation that pass-through was quicker for trade flows marked by lower volatility provides a
very rough check on our model, but the model makes much more precise predictions. We turn now to
testing those predictions.
The bedrock of our theoretical model is the existence of a band where price gaps are much harder
to arbitrage. The simple model we worked with went further by assuming that arbitrage is perfect and
instantaneous outside the band but impossible inside the band. Roughly speaking this would correspond to
a price gap that followed a random walk with reflecting barriers. Plainly, instantaneous price changes are
not the norm due to all sorts of adjustment costs. This leads us to introduce a new element, namely slow
adjustment of the price gap outside of the band. In particular, our hypothesis is that when price gaps are
small enough, there is either very slow or no convergence, while price differentials larger than a certain
threshold are arbitraged away and hence decay according to a stable AR process.
In essence, the theoretical model allows for nonlinear adjustment to long-run equilibrium. It
predicts a sort of regime switching, where the applicable regime depends upon the size of the gap. In the
statistical literature, this sort of adjustment process is called a threshold autoregressive (TAR) process.
Recent research shows that multiple-regimes threshold models are more powerful explanations for
modelling purchasing power parity (PPP) in the presence of international trade and arbitrage costs.
                                               
7 Although this paper focuses on the impact of exchange rate volatility on the persistence of deviations away from the law of
one price, there are many other reasons for the empirical failure of the law of one price, for example: transportation costs, trade
barriers, imperfect information about prices in different locations, differences in national preferences (for a comprehensive
survey, see Goldberg and Knetter, 1997). Accordingly, we choose our comparison group as ‘other EU’ as these countries
should have similar transport costs and trade barriers as the DM bloc – hence differences in  l  are more likely to be due to
differences in exchange rate volatility rather than other factors.13
Before proceeding to a structural estimation of the TAR process, we provide evidence for one of
the most fundamental predictions of our band-hypothesis, namely that the price-gap adjustment process
should be nonlinear, especially when trade costs are high.
3.2.1  The Tsay test for nonlinearity
A customary way of testing for nonlinearities in TAR literature is a non-parametric test proposed
by Tsay (1989) whose detailed procedure is reported in the Appendix. Our results for the Tsay test report
all significant maximal c
2 (for the DM-block at the 10 percent level of significance). We conclude that we
can reject the hypothesis of linearity in the data.
8 Furthermore, the hypothesis that data are nonlinear in
the presence of higher trading costs is confirmed.
3.3.  TAR estimation
As next step, we estimate our nonlinear data using the TAR methodology (see Appendix for
details). While in general the adjustment process may display many regimes, evidence of a TAR model in
a PPP or LOOP model suggests to initially adopt the parsimonious specification that assumes just one,
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out are the speeds of convergence in and out of the band and the b’s define the band edges.
To keep things simple we assume that the band is symmetric around a zero price gap, so we have only
three parameters to estimate: the two different speeds of convergence l’s and one band edge b.
Conceptually, estimation of the TAR is trivial if one knows the ‘b’ a priori. After all, the TAR
essentially says that the adjustment is driven by two separate models – one for gaps inside the band and
one for gaps outside the band. If we knew the value for b, we could partition the data into two populations
and run a simple AR(1) on the separate sample to obtain consistent estimates of the l’s. We must instead
estimate it. Following a procedure employed, among others, in Taylor (1997), we construct a whole array
of provisional partitions of the data that we use to find the best TAR approximation to the true model.





out, b) as the estimated log likelihood function of the alternative TAR model for a
given b. Estimation proceeds via a grid search on the value of b which maximises the log likelihood ratio
LLR = 2(LTAR – LAR ). Since the TAR model is locally linear, computationally, for any given b, the
maximum likelihood estimation of the TAR corresponds to an OLS estimation on partitioned samples of
case data wholly inside or wholly outside the threshold.
In keeping with the natural experiment logic, we estimate a TAR for German import trade prices
vis-à-vis the DM bloc trade partners and a separate TAR for Germany’s trade with other EU nations.
The results of this procedure are reproduced in Table 2. These results are consistent with the main
predictions of our empirical model. In particular, we find that the band-width (b) is greater for trade
marked by more volatile exchange rate movements, and that the price gap again exhibits greater
persistence for German imports from ‘other EU’ in comparison to German imports from the DM bloc.
Moreover, in line with our priors, we find that the adjustment process is faster outside the band (compared
to inside) for the ‘Other EU’ sample:  inside the band the half-life is 1.85 years while outside it is 1.68
                                               
8 Maximal F and c
2  statistics are: (i) entire dataset c
2(1)= 8.78 with prob >c
2 = 0.003 (ii) DM Block c
2(1)=  2.71 with prob >c
2
=0.099 and (iii) other EU countries c
2(1)=76.88  with prob >c
2 =0.00014
years and this difference is statistically significant. For the DM bloc trade, however, the two adjustment
processes are basically identical with the l’s being –0.392 and –0.391.
9
Table 2: Summary results for TAR estimation (fixed effect panel)
b l
out half-life out of band l
in half-life in band
DM Block 0.460 -0.392 1.394 -0.391 1.399
(0.011)*** (0.014)***
Other EU 0.734 -0.338 1.683 -0.313 1.845
(0.036)*** (0.016)***
Note: Estimation of TAR(2,2,1) using a maximum likelihood grid search over b.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a model where firms choose the extent to which they can bilaterally ‘price to
market’ by investing in mechanisms that increase the cost of cross-border price arbitrage. Examples of
such mechanisms include differentiating products by market, or lobbying for regulator controls that make
third-party arbitrage expensive. As Friberg (2001) showed, the degree of bilateral exchange rate volatility
is an important determinant of how profitable such segmentation investments may be. Our model goes
beyond this by allowing firms a continuous choice of progressively more expensive segmentation
strategies that result in their being able to maintain correspondingly larger price gaps. A straightforward
prediction of our model – and one that is empirically testable – is that the no-arbitrage bands should be
wider for bilateral trading relationships where firms anticipate a higher level of exchange rate volatility.
To test this prediction we rely on a ‘natural experiment’ from Europe. While most intra-European
bilateral exchange rates were volatile in the 1980s and 1990s, one group of countries – the DM bloc –
consistently maintained very narrow margins of fluctuation. We therefore estimate separate threshold
autoregressive (TAR) processes for intra-DM bloc trade and Germany’s trade with other EU nations. Our
results, namely that the intra-DM bloc band is narrower, and that the degree of persistence of the price gap
for intra-DM bloc trade is lower relative to Germany’s other trade, are consistent with the theoretical
predictions. The implication is that monetary union could produce changes in corporate strategies that
result in faster cross-border transmission of price movements via the import and export price channel
which, in turn, would tend to homogenise price movements across the member countries of a monetary
union.
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Appendix 1: Data description
Our dataset consists of disaggregated annual producer and import price data covering the period
1975-1995. We calculated price gaps as the difference, in absolute values, between the natural logarithms
of the German bilateral  import price and the corresponding exporter’s producer price indices (base year
1990).Import prices are for 52 (4-digit ISIC rev.2) German manufacturing sectors and producer prices
from 17 industrialized trade partners (remaining EU countries, Canada, Japan and US) relating to 8 (2-
digit ISIC rev.2) sectors. Import prices are taken from the OECD’s International Trade by Commodities
Statistics (ITCS) and have been transformed from SITC rev.3 to ISIC rev.2 in order to be compatible with
the industrial classification of producer prices. Producer prices are from the OECD Indicators of Industry
and Services database.All data are measured in national currency of the exporter. Exchange rate volatility
is measured as the standard deviation of the first difference of the end of period monthly natural log of the
nominal exchange rate (IFS) in the year preceding period t.
Appendix 2: Procedure for estimating and testing
The Tsay test for non-linearity:
 Tsay (1989) proposes a very general specification test that compares a generic TAR alternative




i if r(i)>xt-1>r(i-1). Where r(i) are non trivial thresholds. This test works with cases of16
data (xt-xt-1) with t=1,…,T. A case data is composed of a pair of temporally consecutive changes in the
price gaps, e.g. xt-xt-1 is one case and xt-1-xt-2 is another. The case data are ordered according to the
lagged value of the price gap, that decides between which thresholds r(i) each case is located. This
process is repeated twice, first in ascending and then in descending order. The reason why the test should
be run with both increasing and decreasing ordering of the arranged case data is of practical nature and
lies in the fact that, especially in small samples, the case data may not fall in all of the regimes delineated
by every threshold value. In this paper, we adopt that practice and we report only the most significant p-
values for each of the two (descending and ascending) F-tests. The test goes as follows: we run an AR(1)
on the ordered data and generate a series of recursive residuals ets on all the case data. We then regress the
predictive recursive residuals on the dependent variable (the contemporaneous price gap) by OLS, i.e.
ets=a0+a1xt+uts. If these residuals are orthogonal to the dependent variable, then we can reject non-linearity
in the adjustment process. The orthogonality test amounts to calculating the conventional F statistic for
this regression, which for large N approximates a c
2 random distribution. The intuition of the test is that if
there is regime switching, only the first ‘n’ cases (falling under the first regime) will show orthogonality
properties, while the remaining (N-n ) cases will follow a different behaviour revealing the point of
switching which should be related to the size of the price gap.
TAR estimation:
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where xt the price gap at time t and xt  its lagged value, l
in and l
out are the speeds of convergence in and
out of the band while bhi  and blo define respectively the upper and lower band edge. To keep things
simple we assume that the band is symmetric around a zero price gap, so we have only three parameters to
estimate: the two l’s and the absolute value of b. The aim is to test the likelihood function of  equation
(16) against the AR(1) model Dxt=lxt-1+et . This can be done by maximising the likelihood ratio
LLR=2(LTAR-LAR1) where LTAR and LAR1 are maximum likelihood of the TAR and AR(1) models,
respectively.
Procedure
Not having the values for the band edges ‘b’ in hand, we must estimate them as a first step by
means of a search algorithm. The technique that we used for calculating the TAR is the following. Step 1:
order the absolute values of price gaps by size; step 2:partition the ordered data into steps of the smallest
possible width marked by candidate thresholds bk . In our estimation we eliminate partitions with 12 or
fewer observations in either part of the partition. The only limitation to our search is that, in a normal
distribution, a commodity point is unlikely to be close to the 0
th or 100
th percentile. For these extreme
points there are not sufficient observations to provide an efficient estimate, therefore we select an interval
stretching from the 10th
  to the 90
th percentile within which to look for the candidate thresholds. Step 3:
for each candidate threshold bk partition the sample in observation wholly inside and outside the band and
calculate the maximum likelihood TAR. Since the TAR model is locally linear, computationally, for any
given b, the maximum likelihood estimation of the TAR corresponds to an OLS estimation on partitioned
samples of case data wholly inside or wholly outside the threshold. Step 4 : After calculating the
maximum likelihood estimation of the AR(1) model, compute the likelihood ratio LLR=2(LTAR-LAR1).





out, b) as the estimated log likelihood function of the alternative TAR model
for a given b. Step 5: estimation ends with a grid search on the value of the band edge b that maximises
the log likelihood ratio LLR = 2(LTAR – LAR ).17
Appendix 3: Results using non-demeaned data
Table 3: Summary results for TAR on country groups and data partitioned according to degree of
volatility (panel, fixed effects, non-demeaned data)




















































































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. C represents the constant. “All” represents Canada, Finland, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and United States
as well as the DM bloc and other EU nations.
Table 3 above shows the results using fixed effects, but: (a) uses non-demeaned data; (b) shows
the naïve estimate of l (i.e., AR1 l) as well as estimates of l inside the band [i.e., l (in)]  and outside the
band [i.e., l (out)]; and (c) also experiments with different groupings of the data. For example, the left-
hand-side of the table shows the results for the same two sub-groups as Table 1 in the main text (i.e., ‘DM
bloc’ and ‘other EU’), while the right-hand-side splits the sample into two sets of observations, one
displaying low-volatility and the other high-volatility (the resulting split is not country specific since the
same import supplier may be classed as low-volatility in some years and high-volatility in other years).
Starting with the left-hand-side of the table and reading down vertically, we see that the non-
demeaned data give qualitatively the same results as Table 1 in the main text. That is, for the naïve AR1
specifications (i.e., AR1 l), we see that the DM bloc has the largest estimated l - the fastest speed of
response – in line with our theoretical predictions (i.e., an estimated  l of –0.37 for the DM bloc,
compared with –0.33 for all groups and –0.29 for the other EU countries). However, unlike our earlier
results using de-meaned data, using the TAR technique the estimated l  inside and outside of the bands
are not statistically different for any of the groups. Meanwhile, turning to the right-hand-side of Table 3,
we see that the naïve AR1 specifications (i.e., AR1 l) show that the low-volatility observations exhibit a
higher estimated l compared to the high volatility observations (i.e., -0.39 compared to  –0.21). Again,
this is in line with our theoretical priors that the persistence of price differentials is greater for high
volatility exchange rates relative to less-volatile bilateral exchange rates. Moreover, the results for both
the high and low-volatility groupings show that l is larger outside of the band in comparison to inside the
band, which is again in line with our theoretical priors.